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Abstract
Despite the drastic consequences, corruption and anticorruption compliance risks associated with
the activities of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have not received adequate
attention. NGOs face many of the same risks as traditional business organizations, like violating
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other foreign hribery laws, as well as susceptibility to becom-
ing a victim of corruption. An anonymous survey of international NGOs conducted by the authors
demonstrates that, for various reasons, NGOs have tended to languish behind business organiza-
tions in addressing their corruption-related risks. Unlike a business, the basis for an NGO's fund-
ing often limits what resources can be devoted to compliance. Yet, unlike a business, an NGO's
reputational risk is much greater. For this reason, NGOs must give greater attention to putting
in place robust anticorruption compliance programs like those instituted by business organizations.
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Introduction
Over the course of the past decade, enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), prohibiting the bribery of foreign officials, 2 has
experienced tremendous growth.3 The growth of foreign bribery prosecutions under the
FCPA has been exponential in nature4 when consideration is also given to the use of the
FCPA's accounting and record-keeping provisions as an alternative means of prosecuting
behavior prohibited by the anti-bribery provisions.5
As Lanny Breuer, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) has stated, "we are in a new era of FCPA enforcement; and
we are here to stay."6 This statement accords with the recent record of the DOJ and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the government agencies charged with en-
forcement of the FCPA. In 2010 alone, the DOJ and SEC resolved twenty-three FCPA
enforcement cases with $1.8 billion in fines and disgorged profits.7 Over fifty individuals
were indicted, tried, or sentenced for FCPA violations during the same period of time-a
record number since the FCPA's adoption in 1977.8 In 2009-2010, the DOJ alone col-
lected nearly $2 billion from FCPA cases. 9
Entire industries have become the focal point of FCPA investigations. For example, in
November 2009, Mr. Breuer announced that the pharmaceutical industry would be the
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (2010), 78dd-1,2,3 (1998), 78ff (2002).
2. Id. § 78dd-1,2,3.
3. Thomas R. Fox, FCPA Enforcement: Why the Increase Between the First 25 Years and the Last 5?, FCPA
COMPLIANCE AND ETIncs BLOG (Mar. 11, 2011, 6:48 AM), http://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/2011/03/ll/fcpa-
enforcement-why-the-increase-between-the-first-25-years-and-the-last-5/.
4. Id.
5. Often overlooked in the dramatic increase in FCPA enforcement is the critical role of the FCPA's
accounting and record-keeping provisions. See FCPA § 78m. In addition to prohibiting improper induce-
ments to foreign officials, the FCPA placed new and significant obligations on issuers to maintain records that
accurately reflect transactions and dispositions of assets and to maintain systems of internal accounting con-
trols. Id. They apply to foreign and domestic issuers of securities as defined by Section 3 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 as entities required to register under Section 12 or file reports under Section 15(d). See
id. §§ 78a-c, 78o(d), 781. Issuers can include foreign entities with American Depository Receipts (ADRs).
Unlike the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions, the accounting and record-keeping provisions also apply to ma-
jority-owned foreign subsidiaries of an issuer. Id. § 78m(b)(6). The anti-bribery provisions and accounting
and record-keeping provisions "were intended to work in 'tandem' and thereby complement one another."
Stuart H. Deming, The Potent and Broad-Ranging Implications of the Accounting and Record-Keeping Provisions of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 465, 468 (2006) (citing S. REP. No. 95-114,
at 7 (1977)), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098. "For example, the Senate Report associated with the
FCPA's passage stated that 'a U.S. company "which looks the other way" in order to be able to raise the
defense that they were ignorant of bribes made by a foreign. subsidiary, could be in violation of [the account-
ing and record-keeping provisions] requiring companies to devise and maintain adequate accounting con-
trols."' Id. at 468, n.14 (citing S. REP. No. 95-114, at 11).
6. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Assistant Att'y Gen. Lanny A. Breuer Speaks at the 24th Nat'l Confer-
ence on the FCPA (Nov. 16, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/crininal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-
speech-101 116.html.
7. The FCPA Blog, 2010 FCPA Enforcement Index Gan. 3, 2011, 7:02 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/
blog/2011/1/3/2010-fcpa-enforcement-index.html.
8. Id.
9. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra note 6.
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next focus of the DOJ's FCPA enforcement efforts.1o Freight-forwarding, telecommuni-
cations, oil and gas, and tobacco industries also drew considerable attention from the DOJ
and SEC in 2010 and 2011.11
Even though the United States and much of the developed world are home to many
nonprofit and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that operate in countries where
corruption is rife, this large sector has yet to be the special focus of enforcement activity.
But NGOs and nonprofits suffer many of the same corruption-related risks as traditional
business organizations. Are NGOs and nonprofits subject to the FCPA, and can they and
their officers, employees, and agents be held liable for FCPA violations? Could the NGO
and nonprofit sector be the next frontier in FCPA enforcement?
Related questions include: What are the implications for NGOs and nonprofits as a
result of the other anti-bribery legal regimes being implemented and increasingly en-
forced by other countries? What special provisions are made for NGOs or nonprofits?
Are they in any way exempted from the prohibitions on foreign bribery? If not, what are
the implications? How else can corruption affect the activities of international NGOs?
What proactive steps are they taking? What steps should they be taking? What consider-
ations are unique to NGOs and nonprofits?
Many of these questions cannot be adequately addressed in this article. Rather, the
article seeks to draw the attention of NGOs and nonprofits engaged in international en-
deavors to the growing nature of their compliance risks and the implications of those risks.
At the same time, this article seeks to alert policy makers and the legal community to the
unique problems that exist in this arena and highlight areas for future research and prac-
tice development.
In addressing these and related issues, the acronym "NGO" will be used to refer to both
non-governmental organizations and nonprofit or not-for-profit organizations. In the
United States, and elsewhere, these terms are often used interchangeably to refer to orga-
nizations that pursue some wider social aim; that do not distribute surplus funds to owners
or shareholders; and that are normally exempt from income and property taxation. Unless
the context dictates otherwise, the term "NGO" will be used throughout this article.
10. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Assistant Att'y Gen. Lanny A. Breuer's Keynote Address to the Tenth
Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory and Compliance Congress and Best Practices Forum (Nov. 12, 2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/documents/l1-12-09breuer-pharma
speech.pdf.
11. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Alcatel-Lucent S.A. and Three Subsidiaries Agree to Pay $92
Million to Resolve FCPA Investigation (Dec. 27, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/De-
cember/10-crm-1481.html; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Alliance One Int'l Inc. and Universal Corp. Re-
solve Related FCPA Matters Involving Bribes Paid to Foreign Gov't Officials (Aug. 6, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/August/10-crn-903.html; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Oil Servs.
Cos. and a Freight Forwarding Co. Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay More Than
$156 Million in Criminal Penalties (Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2010/Novem-
ber/10-crm-1251.html.
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I. NGOs and International Assistance
The most recent edition of the Yearbook ofInternational Organizations lists 64,523 inter-
national "civil society organizations" in 300 countries and territories.12 The United States
and much of the developed world are home to many NGOs involved in an immense vari-
ety of activities domestically and abroad. These activities include education and cultural
development, conservation and preservation, fighting poverty and disease, humanitarian
assistance, and other forms of foreign aid and disaster relief. Geographically, many of the
larger NGOs operate in scores of countries all over the world. For example, among U.S.-
based NGOs in 2010 alone, the American Red Cross assisted more than sixty-eight mil-
lion people in sixty-six countries;' 3 AmeriCares Foundation was active in ninety-seven
countries;' 4 and CARE USA worked in eighty-seven countries, reaching more than
eighty-two million people.' 5 Faith-based organizations are not far behind, and some even
surpass secular NGOs in the reach of their overseas activities. World Vision, a Christian
humanitarian relief and development organization, works in nearly 100 countries1 6 while
the Catholic Relief Services' activities spread to more than 100 countries on five
continents.17
The geographic extension of these NGOs is matched by their hefty budgets. According
to the Chronicle of Philanthropy, in fiscal year 2009, the latest year for which complete data
is available, each of the four largest U.S.-based NGOs focusing on international charitable
work, AmeriCares Foundation, Feed The Children, Food For The Poor, and World Vi-
sion, had a total revenue of over $1 billion.18 Even during the recent economic downturn
when charitable giving was down by eleven percent, 19 Food for the Poor and World Vi-
sion reported that their net income in 2010 stayed above $1 billion, at $1.047 billion and
$1.041 billion respectively. 20 The revenue of the American Red Cross for 2010 was al-
most $3.6 billion, with over $252 million spent on programs outside the United States. 21
12. Union of Int'l Ass'ns, Yearbook of International Organizations Online, http://www.uia.be/yearbook
(last visited Jul. 10, 2011).
13. AMERIcAN RED CRoss, GLOBAL IMPACT REPORT, FiscAL YEAR 2010, available at http://
www.redcross.org/www-files/Documents/pdf/intemationalOISDreport.pdf.
14. AMERICARES FOUND., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, available at http://www.americares.org/newsroom/pub-
lications/.
15. CARE USA, CARE's Work, http://www.care.org/careswork/index.asp (last visited June 5, 2011).
16. World Vision, Our International Work, http://www.worldvision.org/content.nsf/learn/our-interna-
tional-work (last visited June 5, 2011).
17. Catholic Relief Services, About Catholic Relief Services, http://crs.org/about/ (last visited June 5,
2011).
18. The Chronicle of Philanthropy, Philanthropy 400 Data, available at http://philanthropy.com/premium/
stats/philanthropy400/index.php?search=Search&category=International&year=2010&sort=income total
(last visited June 26, 2011).
19. William P. Barrett, America's Biggest Charities, FORBES.COM, Dec. 6, 2010, http://www.forbes.com/
forbes/2010/1206/investment-guide-charity-americares-united-way-ymca-biggest-charities.htm.
20. FOOD FOR THE POOR, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, available at http://www.foodforthepoor.org/about/fi-
nances/annualreport_2010b.pdf; Larry Probus, World Vision CFO, Financial Assessment of 2010 and Out-
look for 2011, available at http://www.worldvision.org/resources.nsf/Main/annual-review-2010-resources/
$FILE/AR 201OLetterFromCFO.pdf.
21. Bryan Rhoa, American Red Cross CFO, FY10 Financial Results, available at http://www.redcross.org/
portal/site/en/menuitem.d229a5f06620c6052blecfbf43181aaO/?vgnextoid=666bl3eb7d83e2lOVgnVCMIO
000089f0870aRCRD&vgnextchannel=0bf26a5e61dcell0VgnVCM10000089f0870aRCRD.
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Significant parts of the budgets of many NGOs are financed by the U.S. government
through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. State Depart-
ment, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and other government entities, as well as
by international governmental and other organizations, such as the United Nations and
the World Bank. 22 The traditional U.S. government foreign aid model, as represented by
USAID,23 relies on private-sector contractors, including NGOs, for the vast majority of
program implementation.24 In 2008, eighty-five percent of USAID's budget was commit-
ted to contracting organizations through direct grants, cooperative agreements, or con-
tracts.25 NGOs routinely compete for USAID grants and contracts along with for-profit
entities. NGOs may also sub-contract for other organizations receiving government
funding.26
A well-developed network of regular USAID contractors and subcontractors includes
both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations. Some of them have been working with
USAID for decades, administering projects worth hundreds of millions of dollars and en-
compassing scores of countries. 27 A number of large NGOs, such as CARE, Catholic
Relief Services, and Save the Children, are major USAID contractors. Among the top
twenty "vendors" that USAID lists for 2010 are eight U.S.-based nonprofits, with the
amounts of money awarded to them ranging from $165 million to over $432 million. 28
The World Bank also recognizes NGOs as "important actors in the development pro-
cess" and frequently relies on them in the delivery of its programs.29 Projects supported
by the World Bank often involve national and international NGOs3 0 because of the "skills
and resources they bring to emergency relief and development activities and because they
22. Though many U.S. government agencies are involved in international development and foreign assis-
tance, in the interest of brevity this article will largely focus on USAID as the primary source of funding.
23. In 2010, USAID administered about $22 billion in programs. CURT TARNOFF & MARIAN LEONARDO
LAWSON, FOREIGN AID: AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.
R40213, at 21 (2011), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rptsR40213-20110210.pdf.
24. Id. at 26; see also Save The Children, Supporting Local Ownership & Building National Capacity:
Applying a Flexible and Country-Based Approach to Aid Instruments (May 2010), http://www.savethechil-
dren.org/atf/cf/%7B9def2ebe-10ae-432c-9bdO-df9ld2eba74a%7D/Save-the-Children-Aid-modalities-for-
country-ownership-May-2010.pdf.
25. Save The Children, supra note 24, at 1.
26. For example, USAID awarded a two-year grant to Catholic Relief Services for the Community Reset-
tlement and Rehabilitation Project in post-civil war Liberia. The latter selected World Vision as a sub-
grantee to conduct food distribution and food-for-work projects, parts of the USAID grant. See World Vi-
sion, World Vision Statement Regarding Alleged Fraud in Liberia, http://www.worldvision.org/content.nsf/
about/20090604-liberia (last visited June 5, 2011).
27. For example, Chemonics International Inc., a USAID contractor since 1975, worked in almost 140
countries managing more than 900 projects in all key development areas. USAID, About Chemonics Int'l,
http://ghiqc.usaid.gov/hpi/contractor/chemonics.html (last visited June 5, 2011). It "currently manages more
than 105 contracts for USAID in some 70 countries." Id.
28. USAID, USAID Budget: Where Does USAID's Money Go?, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/
money/ (last visited June 5, 2011) (listing the following nonprofits: Partnership for Supply Chain Mgmt.,
Int'l Relief and Dev., Academy for Educational Dev., Catholic Relief Services, Family Health Int'l, Mgmt.
Sciences for Health, Research Triangle Institute, and Mercy Corps).
29. The World Bank, Civil Society-Involving Nongovernmental Organizations in Bank-Supported Activ-
ities, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/,,print:Y-isCURL:Y-content
MDK:22511723-pagePK:220503-piPK:220476-theSitePK:228717,00.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2011).
30. CHRISTOPHER GIBBS, CLAUDIA FUMO & THOMAS Kusy, NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
WORLD BANK-SUPPORTED PROJECTS: A REVIEW 1 (The World Bank 1999), available at http:/Anweb90.
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foster participatory development processes." 31 The World Bank also uses NGOs as con-
tractors and grantees.32 Thirty-three large international NGOs are listed on the World
Bank's website as those "with whom the Bank maintains ongoing relations through policy
dialogue, training, and/or [sic] operational collaboration." 33 At least a dozen of them are
based in the United States or have U.S. branches.34
Acknowledging the role played by NGOs and other nonprofits, the World Bank calls
civil society organizations--the term that includes such diverse entities as "community
groups, non-governmental organizations, ... labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable
organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and founda-
tions," 3s--"significant players in global development assistance."36 The World Bank esti-
mated that, as of 2006, civil society organizations "provided approximately . .. $15 billion
in international assistance."37
II. NGOs and Corruption Risks
Many NGOs, especially those providing humanitarian assistance and engaged in devel-
opment projects, operate in developing countries where they face the same risks as tradi-
tional business organizations. One of those risks is corruption. NGOs face two kinds of
corruption-related risks. One is the risk of becoming an offender by paying a bribe to a
government official, violating the FCPA or other anti-bribery laws. The other risk is
becoming a victim of corruption, such as when the funds or assets of an NGO are misap-
propriated or otherwise misused.
A. THE RISK OF VIOLATING FOREIGN BRIBERY LAWS
Under the FCPA, mere status as an NGO does not exempt an entity from being subject
to the anti-bribery provisions.38 NGOs fall into the category of "domestic concerns" sub-
ject to the anti-bribery provisions. 39 No legal basis exists for distinguishing between a
traditional commercial enterprise and an NGO in determining what qualifies as a "domes-
worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/167F2AAEA498DBC185256817004C81
BE/$file/NGO Book.pdf.
31. Id. at vii.
32. See The World Bank, Civil Society-Frequently Asked Questions, http://go.worldbank.org/
Q4JHC82S80 (last visited June 26, 2011); The World Bank, Civil Society-Civil Society Organizations,
http://go.worldbank.org/KK5KGT24XO (last visited June 26, 2011); The World Bank, Projects-Contract
Awards Search, http://go.worldbank.org/GM7GBOVGSO (last visited June 26, 2011).
33. Civil Society Organizations, spra note 32.
34. See, e.g., Action Aid Int'l, Where We Work, http://www.actionaid.org/where-we-work (last visited June
26, 2011); The Access Initiative, TAI Countries, http://www.accessinitiative.org/countries (last visited June
26, 2011); Environmental Defense Fund, Our Offices, http://www.edf.org/page.cfm?tagid=361 (last visited
June 26, 2011).
35. The World Bank, Civil Society-Defining Civil Society, http://go.worldbank.org/4CE7WO46KO (last
visited June 26, 2011).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (1998).
39. Id.
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tic concern."4o No "carve out," "safe harbor," or other express exception exists, nor does
an exception exist for an NGO that is strictly charitable in nature.4 '
The definition of what constitutes a "domestic concern" is broad. In addition to "any
individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States,"4 2 a "domestic con-
cern" includes "any corporation, partnership, association, joint stock company, business
trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of
business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of State of the United
States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States."43
Though not binding as precedent, in a recent Opinion Procedure Release the DOJ
explicitly found a nonprofit organization to be a "domestic concern" subject to the terms
of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions."4 It involved "a non-profit, U.S.-based
microfinance institution . . . whose mission is to provide loans and other basic financial
services to the world's lowest-income entrepreneurs." 45 To support its mission, the
microfinance institution received grants and investments from the "United States govern-
ment, other governmental . . . aid agencies and development banks, nongovernmental
organizations . . . and private investors."6
Arguably, the only categorical exception may relate to whether the business of the
NGO falls within the prohibitions of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. No clarity is
provided as to whether the business that is sought to be obtained or retained must be
commercial in nature or whether it extends more generally to the business of an individual
or entity. What constitutes "business" under the anti-bribery provisions has yet to be
clearly defined. 47 Neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history provide
clear guidance as to whether activities of an NGO constitute "business" as that term is
used within the context of the anti-bribery provisions.
While the legislative history of the anti-bribery provisions focuses on business in the
classic commercial sense,4 8 the legislative history also demonstrates that "the business
nexus requirement [was] not to be interpreted unduly narrowly."49 "When the FCPA is
40. Id.
41. See generally id. § 78dd-2.
42. Id. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(A).
43. Id. § 78-2(h)(1)(B).
44. FCPA Review, 10-02 Op. Dep't of Justice 5 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/opinion/2010/1002.pdf. In two other opinion procedure releases, the DOJ implicitly found the non-
profit entities to be domestic concerns subject to the FCPA. See FCPA Review, 08-03 Op. Dep't ofJustice 1
(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0803.pdf; FCPA Review, 96-01
Op. Dep't ofJustice 1 (1996), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/1996/9601.pdf.
In the more recent of the two releases, the entity seeking the opinion was found to be a domestic concern.
08-03 Op. Dep't ofJustice, at 1. But no reference was made to it being a non-profit. See id. Yet it is a matter
of public record that the entity, TRACE International, Inc., is a non-profit organization. See Trace Int'l,
About Us, https://secure.traceinternational.org/about (last visited June 26, 2011). The older opinion proce-
dure release made no express finding that the entity seeking the opinion was a domestic concern. See 96-01
Op. Dep't of Justice, at 1. However, only issuers and domestic concerns are eligible to obtain an opinion
pursuant to the opinion procedure release. 28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (1992).
45. 10-02 Op. Dep't of Justice, svpra note 44, at 1.
46. Id.
47. See FCPA § 78dd-2(a).
48. Reference was made to "corporate bribery." S. REP. No. 95-114, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101.
49. United States v. Kay (Kay 11), 359 F.3d 738, 754 (5th Cir. 2004),
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read as a whole, its core of criminality is seen to be bribery of a foreign official to induce
him to perform an official duty in a corrupt manner."50 The FCPA was enacted not only
because foreign bribery was "morally and economically suspect, but also because it was
causing foreign policy problems for the United States."51
Like the FCPA, none of the international anti-bribery conventions provides an express
exception for NGOs. Of the three that the United States has ratified, the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of For-
eign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention), 52 the
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (OAS Convention),5 3 and the United
Nations Convention against Corruption (UN Convention),54 all make reference to there
being a need for a business or commercial nexus in order for the conduct to be prohibited.
The OECD Convention and the UN Convention make specific reference to the prohibi-
tion applying to "the conduct of international business."55 The OAS Convention refers to
the prohibition applying "in connection with any economic or commercial transaction."5 6
But the business nexus requirements of the most important of the international anti-
bribery conventions, the UN and OECD Conventions, 7 are not narrow in scope. The
UN Convention expands on what may be viewed as a more customary definition of "inter-
national business" to include "the provision of international aid" within the meaning of
"the conduct of international business."s8 The Interpretative Notes for the Official
50. Id. at 761.
51. Id. at 746.
52. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,
Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Convention].
53. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35
I.L.M. 724 [hereinafter OAS Convention].
54. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 37 [hereinafter UN
Convention].
55. OECD Convention, supra note 52, art. 1; UN Convention, supra note 54, art. 16.
56. OAS Convention, supra note 53, art. VIII.
57. The basis for giving primacy to the OECD and UN Conventions is summarized in the following:
The OECD Convention is narrowly tailored to focus specifically on bribery of foreign officials in
the context of obtaining or retaining business. Given its narrow focus and its effective follow-up
mechanism for ensuring active and uniform enforcement, the OECD Convention has already had
a dramatic impact in a relatively short period on the number of countries actively investigating
and prosecuting individuals and entities for improper inducements to foreign officials. As en-
forcement activity increases and as more countries accede to the OECD Convention, the body of
law associated with the OECD Convention will become a principal resource for defining the
international norms.
Due to its global nature, and the vast number of ratifications that have already taken place, the
UN Convention ... will play the critical role in the globalization of the international norms.
Initially, the UN Convention will serve to expand the scope of cooperation and prompt the adop-
tion of domestic legislation in parts of the world less inclined to participate in the other interna-
tional and anti-bribery conventions. Over time, with the exception of the OECD Convention,
the UN Convention will surpass many of the regional anti-bribery conventions in becoming the
focus of [future] developments.
STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPr PRAcriCEs Acr AND THE NEWV INTERNATiONAL NoRMis
306 (2d ed. 2010) (footnotes omitted).
58. Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention Against Corruption, Report on the Work of Its
First to Seventh Sessions, Addendum, art. 16, U.N. Doc. A/58/422/Add.1 (Oct. 7, 2003), available at https://
www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/conventioncorruption/session_7/422addl.pdf.
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Records, Travaux Preparatoires, of the Negotiations of the UN Convention (Interpretative
Notes to the UN Convention), state that the "phrase 'the conduct of international busi-
ness' is intended to include the provision of international aid."59 By its very nature, the
provision of international aid includes the work of NGOs in foreign settings.
The significance of the Interpretative Notes to the UN Convention cannot be over-
stated. The UN Convention is the only globally negotiated anti-bribery convention that
addresses the bribery of foreign officials in the conduct of international business. With
154 parties, the UN Convention has been signed and ratified by most of the world and
virtually the entire developed world. 60 Notable is the absence of any reservations or dec-
larations with respect to Article 16, the prohibition on the bribery of foreign officials in
the conduct of international business. 61 This includes the United States.62 The absence
of any reservations or declarations is also likely to influence how the implementing legisla-
tion of many countries is interpreted and applied.63
59. Id.
60. UN Convention, supra note 54. The one notable exception is Germany. But Germany is a party to the
OECD Convention and has been active in the enforcement of its anti-bribery legislation. See FRiTz HEI-
MANN, GILLIAN DELL & KELLY MCCARTHY, PROGRESs REPORT 2011: ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD
ANTi-BRIBERY CONVENTION 5 (Transparency International 2011), available at http://www.cransparency.org/
globalpriorities/international conventions. For the status of the UN Convention, see United Nations Treaty
Collection, United Nations Convention against Corruption, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=IND&mtdsg no=XVIII-14&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).
61. See UN Convention, supra note 54.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Kay (Kay ll), 359 F.3d 738, 756 (5th Cir. 2004). In determining that U.S. law
fulfilled the obligations of the United States under the UN Convention without the need for implementing
legislation, the Senate Report stated that "[n]o implementing legislation is required for the [UN] Conven-
tion." S. ExEc. REP. No. 109-18, at 6 (2006), available at http://ftp.resource.org/gpo.gov/reports/109/
er018.109.txt. "The United States of America declares that, in view of its reservations, current United States
law, including the laws of the States of United States, fulfills the obligations of the [UN] Convention for the
United States." Id. at 10. There was no express reservation, declaration, or understanding directly address-
ing Article 16 of the UN Convention relating to transnational bribery. Id. at 9-10. U.S. ratification may
thereby have implicitly broadened the construction to be applied to the business nexus requirement. Or,
alternatively, the FCPA was, in effect, deemed to be already sufficiently broad to include such an interpreta-
tion. In the prepared remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft associated with the submission of the UN
Convention to the U.S. Senate for ratification, he specifically responded to a question as to the authoritative
nature of the Interpretative Notes of the UN Convention. In his answer, he stated:
The Interpretative Notes for the official records (travaux preparatoires) preserve certain points
relating to articles of the instruments that are subsidiary to the text, but nonetheless of potential
interpretive importance. In accordance with Article 32 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties, to which the United States is not a party but that reflects several commonly accepted
principles of treaty interpretation, preparatory work such as that memorialized in the Interpreta-
tive Notes may serve as a supplementary means of interpretation, if an interpretation of the treaty
done in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the terms of the treaty
results in ambiguity or is manifestly absurd. Thus, the Interpretive Notes, while not binding as a
matter of treaty law, could be important as a guide to the meaning of terms in the Convention
and Protocols.
Id. at 60.
Prior to the U.S. ratification of the UN Convention, the settlement reached in United States v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc., No. 1:99CV12566 (D. Mass., filed Dec. 14, 1999), reprinted in 5 FCPA REP. 2d 699., 749, sug-
gested that the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions might extend to the provision of international assistance. In
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., in providing foreign assistance to Egypt, USAID awarded contracts to Metcalf & Eddy, a
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In terms of the OECD Convention, the OECD Working Group on Bribery in Interna-
tional Business Transactions (OECD Working Group) has "recommend[ed] that Canada
amend its foreign bribery offence so that it is clear that it applies to bribery in the conduct
of all international business, not just business 'for profit." 64 Under Canada's Corruption
of Foreign Public Officials Act "'business' means any business, profession, trade, calling,
manufacture or undertaking of any kind carried on in Canada or elsewhere for profit."65
The OECD Working Group emphasized that the OECD Convention "does not distin-
guish between 'for profit' and 'not for profit' business transactions." 66 It went on to
explain:
Article 1 of the [OECD] Convention applies to bribery of a foreign public official "in
order to retain business or other improper advantage" . . . The [OECD] Convention
does not limit its scope to transactions that are profitable, and specifically includes
benefits to the briber other than pecuniary gain. [T]he Convention applies to bribery
by "any person" under Article 1, and "legal persons" under Article 2, without any
qualification that the business carried out by the person or [the] nature of the legal
person is or is not for profit. [Otherwise] . . . numerous organisations that, while not
set up to make a profit for themselves, might still bribe in order to secure business,
including state owned and controlled enterprises.67
The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention (CoE Convention),68 one of the
other major international anti-bribery conventions, contains no business nexus require-
ment. It requires parties to the CoE Convention to adopt "legislation and other measures
as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law . . . [the
bribery of] a public official of any other State."69 The Explanatory Report to the COE
Convention emphasizes that there is "no restriction as to the context in which the bribery
of the foreign official occurs."70 Significantly, most Western and Eastern European coun-
U.S. company, for the construction, operation, and maintenance of wastewater treatment facilities for a local
unit of government in Egypt. The chairman of the local unit of government did not participate in the evalua-
tion of bidders for further work on the wastewater treatment facilities. But officials of Metcalf & Eddy knew
that the chairman could influence his subordinates who were involved in the evaluation process and that the
chairman could make his preferences known to USAID officials involved with awarding the contracts. Met-
calf & Eddy provided the chairman and his wife and children with two trips in first class to the United States,
which included travel to tourist destinations. He was also paid cash per diems despite having already been
paid in advance for the trips.
64. OECD WORKING CROUP ON BRIBERY, PHASE 3 REPORT ON CANADA 4 (Mar. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3746,en_2649_37447_44572654 1 l-l37447,00.html [hereinafter
OECD Phase 3 Report on Canada]. The perspective of the OECD Working Group is particularly signifi-
cant. It is the body that was principally responsible for drafting and negotiating the provisions of the OECD
Convention.
65. Corruption of Foreign Officials Act, 1998 S.C., ch. 34, § 2, available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/
dept-min/pub/cfpoa-lcape/guide.pdf.
66. OECD Phase 3 Report on Canada, supra note 64, at 10, 1 17.
67. Id. at 11, 1[ 21 (emphasis in original and footnote omitted).
68. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, Europ. T.S. No. 173, 38 I.L.M. 505.
69. Id. art. 5.
70. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption Explanatory Rep., art. 5, Jan. 27, 1999, E.T.S. No. 173,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Reports/Html73.htm.
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tries, including the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, and Spain, have ratified the
CoE Convention.7 1
In general, mere status as an NGO or a nonprofit organization is not likely to insulate
an entity from the prohibitions of the FCPA and other foreign bribery laws. Moreover,
many NGOs and nonprofit organizations compete directly against traditional for-profit
organizations for USAID, World Bank, UNDP, and other entities' contracts and grants.
Indeed, activities of nonprofit organizations are often similar to or interchangeable with
those of for-profit organizations. 72 As a result, NGOs and nonprofit organizations should
be presumed to be fully subject to the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA and other
foreign bribery laws.
The facts and circumstances of a particular situation will ultimately determine whether
all of the elements necessary for an FCPA or other foreign bribery law violation are pre-
sent. Whether corrupt intent can be established is likely to be the critical factor.73 But
until a well-founded determination is made that the elements required for a violation can-
not be met, an NGO must be presumed to be subject to the terms of the FCPA's anti-
bribery provisions and its foreign counterparts.
1. Risks Factors
How often do NGOs face corruption risks associated with violating foreign bribery laws
and what factors determine these risks? In a limited survey of international NGOs (the
survey),74 the answers to the first question ranged from "never" to "all the time." 75 The
71. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 70 (charting signatures and ratifications).
Though the United States has not ratified the CoE Convention, it is a signatory. Id.
72. For example, the work of medical organizations, educational institutions, and adoption agencies is per-
formed by both for-profit and nonprofit organizations. Nonprofits and NGOs with high pay scales for senior
officials are also less likely to be perceived as being entirely charitable or humanitarian in nature. According
to a USA TODAY review, "[flour chief executives whose government-funded non-profit corporations are paid
to deliver U.S. foreign assistance earned more than half a million dollars in 2007." Ken Dilanian, Review:
High Salaries for Aid Group CEOs, USA TODAY, Sept. 1, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-
08-31-us-aid-groups N.htm; see also Barrett, supra note 19 (listing salaries of the CEOs of the ten largest U.S.
charitable organizations). The highest paid CEOs on the list are the President of American Cancer Society,
at $1.3 million, and of United Way, at $715,000. In 2010, President of the American Red Cross received
$995,718 in pay while the CEO of AED in 2009 was paid over $870,000 in total compensation. See Charity
Navigator, American Red Cross Rating, http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=search.summary&
orgid=3277 (last visited June 22, 2011); CEO Update, 2011 Executive Compensation in Associations, http://
www.ceoupdate.com/articles/articleDetails.htm?articleid=1720 (last visited June 22, 2011).
73. As the degree to which a nonprofit organization's work is providing non-commercial humanitarian
relief increases, the likelihood that an inducement will not be perceived as having the requisite corrupt intent
also increases. A poignant example of the latter is a situation where payments are made to facilitate the
movement of medical supplies or food to people in danger. The payment arguably falls within the duress
exception that U.S. law and, especially, other common law jurisdictions generally recognize. See, e.g., DEM-
ING, supra note 57, at 15. Practical realities associated with a jury trial may also bear upon the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in such a situation.
74. Survey of NGOs and Other Nonprofit Organizations on the Issue of Corruption and Anticorruption
Compliance (Jan. 2011-Feb. 2011) [hereinafter Survey] (data on file with the authors). The survey was con-
ducted by one of the authors on the condition that the information provided, as well as its source, would
remain confidential. For the purpose of anonymity, survey participants will be referenced hereinafter as
"Participant I," "Participant 2," etc. when information obtained from a participant is referenced.
75. Id.
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factors that were determinative of an NGO's exposure to bribery risks include the nature
of its activities, the countries it operates in, the structure of the organization, the pattern
of communication with its field offices, and the level of internal reporting and other inter-
nal controls. 76
The nature of an NGO's activities is the most important factor in determining whether
it will face significant bribery risks. An NGO that conducts, for example, environmental
or conservation programs, provides education and vocational training, or organizes camps
for children would be at a lower risk of violating the FCPA and its counterparts than an
NGO involved with providing humanitarian aid or relief and development services. It
matters little that both NGOs might be operating in the same high-corruption country.
In contrast to a situation where an NGO sends experts, volunteers, and others to do the
work and provide services, much greater opportunities are afforded to local government
officials to demand improper payments when an NGO is distributing or awarding certain
assets or funds.
The general level of corruption in a country raises a red flag.77 In countries where
corruption is a way of life, local culture may be highly tolerant of graft, even tacitly ap-
proving of it as a means of survival. An NGO's indigenous staff or its local partners may
not see a problem with paying bribes, especially small ones, like facilitating payments, to
"keep things moving." 78 As one survey participant noted, "[b]ribes may be paid on our
behalf by local partners but we do not have an ability to monitor them."79 Local employ-
ees and partners may also be highly susceptible to conflicts of interests. They may be
subject to influence by family members, by tribal or ethnic groups, or by other relation-
ships that may not be easy to discern. This may lead to the second type of corruption
risks: the misappropriation or misuse of the funds and resources of an NGO.s0
Whether an NGO operates in a country perceived as being very corrupt is not,81 by
itself, determinative of whether an NGO becomes subject to bribery demands. Though a
country's level of corruption certainly raises concerns as to possible corruption risks in-
volved in operating in that country, it does not necessarily mean that the bribery risks are
imminent. Two of the survey participants, an NGO engaged in environmental projects in
a number of developing countries and an NGO working with young people and families
on educational, recreational, and other similar programs in a multitude of countries, have
never encountered demands for corrupt payments.82 On the other hand, another survey
76. Id.
77. "[I]n general, a red flag is a set of facts that, in a given context, would prompt a reasonable person to
have a basis for concern as to whether prohibited conduct took place or is intended or likely to occur."
DEMING, supra note 57, at 654.
78. Survey, supra note 74, Participants 1 & 2.
79. Id. Participant 2.
80. See infra Part 11.2.
81. Transparency International's (TI) annual surveys and indexes can be very helpful in assessing risks. TI's
Corruption Perceptions Index identifies and compares countries based on the perception of corruption in a
particular country. Transparency Int'l, Corruption Perceptions Index, http://www.transparency.org/pol-
icy.research/surveys-indices/cpi (last visited June 22, 2011). TI's Bribe Payers Index provides a breakdown
by sector in terms of relative degree of perceived corruption. Transparency Int'l, Transparency Interna-
tional's Bribe Payers Index, http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/surveysjindices/bpi (last visited
June 22, 2011).
82. Survey, supra note 74, Participants 4 & 5.
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participant stated, "every country we work in generates corruption-related concerns."83
Generally, the survey participants most frequently named African countries, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan as the most difficult places in which to operate in terms of corruption risks.
The structure of the organization also plays a role in determining the level of risk of
violating foreign bribery laws. More centralized NGOs with reasonable oversight by their
headquarters appear to have lower risks than NGOs with a highly decentralized struc-
ture.84 This is particularly so where the NGO has a multitude of foreign offices with
significant autonomy that are staffed, for the most part, with local employees.85 Similarly,
NGOs relying heavily on indigenous NGOs to carry out their activities face greater
chances of violating foreign bribery laws than NGOs that employ expatriates, at least in
management positions.86
Moreover, organizational structure influences patterns of communication between the
headquarters and field offices. To reduce their risk, some NGOs actively pursue collect-
ing compliance-related information and investigate complaints.87 But in highly decentral-
ized NGOs, local offices have significant autonomy which extends, among other things, to
what issues are reported to headquarters. Most problems are supposed to be addressed at
the local level. As a result, headquarters may rarely hear compliance-related concerns
from the field offices.88 If they do learn of them, it is several months later and often too
late for headquarters to intervene.89 No common practice appears to exist among NGOs
on the related issues of internal reporting and internal controls.
2. Types of Risks
The types of risks of violating foreign bribery laws faced by international NGOs vary
according to the country and activities involved. Some organizations have to deal mostly
with requests for what are often referred to as facilitating or expediting payments for such
things as having documents approved, goods released by customs, or a license for a vehicle
issued or renewed.90 Facilitating payments, typically relatively small in amount, are bribes
"the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmen-
tal action by a foreign official . "91 Under the FCPA, such payments are not prohib-
83. Id. Participant 1.
84. Id. Participant 2.
85. Id.
86. Id. Participant 3.
87. Id.
88. Id. Participants 1 & 3.
89. Id.
90. Id. Participant 1.
91. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b), 2(b), 3(b) (1998). The FCPA further
defines "routine governmental action" as:
an action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in-
(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a
foreign country;
(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders;
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated
with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across country;
(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting
perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or
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ited.92 But other foreign bribery laws, such as the Bribery Act 2010 adopted by the United
Kingdom (UK Bribery Act), do not contain exceptions for facilitating payments. 93 Thus,
authorities in the United Kingdom may prosecute a U.S.-based NGO with a U.K. branch
for facilitating payments in a third country.94
Other NGOs may see more serious extortionist demands, for example, from police or
military at road checkpoints for the right to proceed further into the territory with hu-
manitarian assistance or from local officials or tribal leaders eager to receive "their" share
of food or other assistance.95 While some checkpoint demands may be satisfied with a
payment as small as a twenty-dollar bill,96 other bribery requests may Javolve significant
amounts of goods or money.97
Some NGOs encounter even greater bribery demands.98 Anecdotal information indi-
cates that occasionally, some NGOs get requests from senior government officials to pay
significant bribes for the right to operate in their country. Though such demands are
usually withdrawn, especially when major donors like USAID or the World Bank get in-
volved, the mere existence of such demands is reflective of the gravity of corruption-re-
lated risks for NGOs.
B. THE RISK OF BECOMING A VicTIM OF CORRUPTION
Despite the general unease among international NGOs regarding possible FCPA viola-
tions, outright requests for bribes do not appear to be their main corruption-related con-
cern.
9 9 Most NGOs' primary compliance concerns are related to corruption in their
programs and activities, such as diversion of aid,'00 misuse of funds,' 0 ' fraud in procure-
(v) actions of a similar nature.
Id. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A).
92. Id. § 78dd-l(a), 2(a), 3(a).
93. Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents.
94. Aside from the compliance concerns, practical reasons may justify the need to ensure that even facilitat-
ing payments are prohibited. Keep in mind that a host country considers a facilitating payment a bribe. In
many countries, NGOs can become the focal point of threats and various forms of retaliation by the host
government or groups that may resent or fear their presence. See, e.g., Center for the Development of De-
mocracy and Human Rights, Report Prepared for the 4th Round of EU-Russia Consultations on Human
Rights, Deteriorating Situation of NGOs and Infringement of the Right to Association in Russia (Nov. 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004 2009/documents/dv/centerfordevelopment_/centerfor
development_en.pdf; Uzbek N.G.O.s Under Threat, VOANws.com, July 28, 2006, http://www.voanews.
com/policy/editorials/a-41-2006-07-31 -voa 1-83105557.html.
95. Survey, supra note 74, Participant 1.
96. Id. Participant 2.
97. Theoretically, even a twenty-dollar payment can get an NGO in trouble. It would be a legal violation
in the host country. For many countries, like the United Kingdom, that do not allow facilitating payments, it
would also be a violation. The circumstances of the road checkpoint situation may also not fall within the
FCPA's exception for facilitating payments. See FCPA 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (1998). The particular facts
will dictate whether the circumstances fall within the category of expediting or securing "the performance of a
routine governmental action." Id. § 78dd-2(b), (l)(3).
98. Survey, supra note 74, Participant 1.
99. Id. Participant 3.
100. Id. Participants 2 & 3.
101. Id.
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ment,102 fraud in reporting documents, and accounting irregularities.1o3 The conse-
quences of corruption in these areas can be even more daunting for NGOs than the
prospect of an enforcement action for an FCPA or other foreign bribery law violation.
Diversion and misuse of aid, when food, medicines, construction materials, and other
items are sold for cash or otherwise embezzled or misused, occur frequently in interna-
tional assistance programs. For example, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria (Global Fund), financed by the United Nations, many national governments
and private organizations,10 4 came to the spotlight in January 2011 after the Global Fund
Inspector General's report revealed that "as much as two thirds" of the Global Fund's
grants in Djibouti, Mali, Mauritania, and Zambia had been "eaten up by corruption." 0 5
The Associated Press story that broke the news cited forged or non-existing receipts for
"training events," forged signatures on travel and lodging claims, questionable bookkeep-
ing, and outright theft. 0 6 Subsequent audits uncovered more violations in other Global
Fund programs. To date, the total amount of money lost to corruption stands at nearly
$53 million. 0 7 In a recent case involving World Vision, a large California-based NGO
subcontracting for a USAID project in Liberia, two of the organization's Liberian manag-
ers diverted ninety-one percent of USAID-funded humanitarian aid for their personal
benefit.os As a result, USAID was defrauded of $1.9 million. 09 An anonymous tip
prompted an internal audit that uncovered the problem; both managers were later charged
and convicted of fraud." 10 World Vision had to reimburse USAID for the misappropri-
ated funds."'
According to one survey participant, fraud in reporting and accounting irregularities
may range in scope from several hundred dollars to much greater amounts involving well-
coordinated and systemic fraud schemes.11 2 The same is true about corruption and fraud
in procurement, which may include collusion, favoritism, lack of transparency, fictitious
bidders, bogus vendors, fake tender processes, overpricing, conflicts of interest, and lack
102. Id. Participants 3 & 4.
103. Id. Participants 2, 3 & 4.
104. "The Global Fund is a unique, public-private partnership and international financing institution dedi-
cated to attracting and disbursing additional resources to prevent and treat [several diseases]." The Global
Fund, About the Global Fund, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/ (last visited June 5, 2011). The
Global Fund provides billions of dollars in assistance to developing countries. Id.
105. AP: Fraud Plagues Global Health Fund, CBS NEWS, Jan. 24, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2011/01/24/world/main7277776.shtnl.
106. Id.
107. John Heilprin, Global Fund Rethinks Transparency Policy after Corruption Scandal, HUFFINGTON POST,
May 10, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/10/global-fund-transparency n_860004.htnl.
108. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Former Humanitarian Workers Convicted for International Fraud
Scheme (Nov. 16, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/10-crm-1305.html;
Nedra Pickler, Workers Charged with Stealing US Aid to Liberia, NEWSVINE.COM, June 4, 2009, http://
www.newsvine.com/_news/2009/06/04/2895439-workers-charged-with-stealing-us-aid-to-liberia.
109. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra note 108.
110. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Former Humanitarian Workers Each Sentenced to 142 Months in
Prison for Defrauding USAID of $1.9 Million (Apr. 26, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
201 1/April/11 -crm-525.html.
111. Id.
112. Survey, supra note 74, Participant 2.
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of competition. I3 Not infrequently, fraud is committed by the local employees or part-
ners in collusion with local government officials. An example is the Academy for Educa-
tional Development (AED) programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan that caused USAID to
suspend AED and the Global Fund's projects in several African countries where local non-
profits fared no better, in terms of corruption and fraud, than government entities.114
The consequences of this kind of corruption for NGOs are difficult to overstate. In
December 2010, USAID suspended AED after uncovering "serious corporate misconduct,
mismanagement, and a lack of internal controls that raise[d] serious concerns of corporate
integrity."It5 USAID undertook a review of every program associated with AED.116
AED's suspension prevented it from bidding on or receiving any further awards from the
U.S. government.17 As a result, on March 3, 2011, after nearly fifty years in existence,
thousands of development projects, and hundreds of millions of dollars in USAID funds,
AED announced that it would sell its assets and dissolve itself."l8 A single program termi-
nation was sufficient to bring the organization down.119
C. CORRUPTION-RELATED RIsKS: TRADmoNAL BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS V.
NGOs
Do NGOs face the same corruption-related risks as more traditional forms of business
organizations? The answer is both yes and no. Obviously, both types of entities are sub-
113. Robert Appleton, Office of the Inspector General, Presentation on Fraud, Misappropriation and Finan-
cial Abuse in Global Fund Grant Programs and the Role of the LFA (Nov. 2010), available at http://
www.theglobalfund.org/documents/lfa/workshops/2010november/
LFAFraudAbuselnGFGrants Presentationen.pdf.
114. Dana Hedgpeth & Josh Boak, USAID Suspends District-Based Nonprofit AEDfrom Contracts amid Investi-
gation, WASHINGTON PosT, Dec. 8, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/
12/08/AR2010120807665.html; Office of the Inspector General, Country Audit of Global Fund Grants to
Zambia, Audit Report No: GF-OIG-09-15 (Oct 5, 2010), available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/docu-
ments/oig/GFCountryAudit-GF-Grants-Zambia-Report-GF-OIG-09-015.pdf. The audit focused on three
government agencies and one nonprofit organization, the Christian Health Association of Zambia, and iden-
tified "significant financial management and control weaknesses, episodes of misappropriation and fraud, and
losses of grant funds" in all four recipients of the Global Fund's grants in Zambia. Id.
115. Press Release, USAID, USAID Suspends Academy for Educational Development from Receiving New




118. Press Release, AED, Statement from the AED Chairman of the Board, Edward W. 'Peter' Russell to
AED Staff (Mar. 3, 2011), available at http://www.aed.org/News/AED-to-Seek-Orderly-Acquisition-and-
Transfer-of-its-Programs-and-Assets.cfin. AED sought a single purchaser and in early June 2011, it was an-
nounced that "FI and AED have signed an asset purchase agreement for FHI to acquire the programs,
expertise, and other assets of AED," with the acquisition to be completed "within the next month, ensuring
that projects continue uninterrupted." Press Release, AED, FHI and AED Sign Asset Purchase Agreement
(June 8, 2011), available at http://www.aed.org/News/Releases/asset-purchase-agreement.cfn. FHI is a
"global health and development organization." FHI, Who We Are, http://www.fhi.org/en/AboutFHI/in-
dex.htm (last visited June 13, 2011).
119. Press Release, AED, AED Pursuing Orderly Transfer and Sale of Its Programs and Assets to a Single
Acquirer (Mar. 10, 2011), available at http://www.aed.org/News/Releases/aed-pursuing-orderly-transfer-and-
sale.cfin.
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ject to the FCPA and other foreign bribery laws.120 But, unlike issuers, which are publicly
held companies that are required to register with the SEC,121 NGOs are not subject to the
accounting and record-keeping provisions of the FCPA.122
Otherwise, a number of factors are common for businesses and NGOs. Individuals
associated with either type of entity, whether officers, directors, employees, or agents, can
be prosecuted for violations of the FCPA and its counterparts in other parts of world.123 If
convicted, a business organization and an NGO can face serious fines, reputational dam-
age, and debarment by governmental agencies, multilateral development banks, and other
funding sources.124 Collateral litigation of various types may also arise.125
Yet for NGOs, the consequences of an investigation and conviction of a corruption-
related offence, like foreign bribery, can be far more devastating. The biggest threat for
most businesses is financial loss, whether stemming from the loss of business opportuni-
ties, profits, decline in stock price,126 or the impact of financial sanctions. Except for
those businesses that rely heavily upon procurement opportunities, long-term survival is
less likely to be in question.
For NGOs, the loss of reputation, and hence donor money, is most feared. In addition
to being barred in many instances from pursuing grants, other charitable funding that is
highly dependent upon goodwill can be expected to decrease or simply dry up as the result
of a corruption-related investigation. Unlike most businesses, NGOs do not have a prod-
120. See discussion, supra Part II. NGOs are treated the same as more traditional business organizations in
being "domestic concerns" under the FCPA. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 78-dd (2)
(1998).
121. See supra text accompanying note 5.
122. FCPA § 78m, ff; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1, 2 (2011).
123. E.g., FCPA § 78dd-2(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern, other than an issuer which is subject to section
78dd-1 of this title, or for any officer, director, employee, or agent ofsuch domestic concern or any
stockholder thereofacting on behalfofsuch domestic concern, to make use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to
pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authoriza-
tion of the giving of anything of value to . .. any foreign official ....
Id. § 78dd-2(a) (emphasis added).
124. A host of statutes and regulatory regimes exist that provide for the debarment from government con-
tracts of individuals and entities found to have engaged in fraud and other forms of corrupt conduct. See, e.g.,
48 C.F.R. 9.406-2 (2011); see also Council Directive 2004/18, 30.4.2004 OJ. (L 134) 114-240 (EC) (on the
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service
contracts). The World Bank and many of the other multilateral lending institutions have instituted a series of
procedures providing for debarment and cross-debarment of individuals and entities found to have engaged in
fraudulent or corrupt activities. See, e.g., Stuart H. Deming, Anti-Corruption Policies: Eligibility and Debarment
Practices at the World Bank and Regional Development Banks, 44 INrT'L LAw. 871, 871 (2010).
125. For example, for a publicly-held company, a derivative action brought by shareholders against the
board and management might follow. See, e.g., Mass Device, Johnson & Johnson Shareholders Sue Over $78
Million Bribery Settlements, http://www.massdevice.com/news/johnson-johnson-shareholders-sue-over-78-
million-bribery-settlements (last visited June 5, 2011).
126. See, e.g., Ellen Byron, Avon's Stock is Hit by New Worries about a Widening Bribery Probe, WALL ST. J.,
May 6, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703992704576305291564861446.html.
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uct to sell.127 In most situations, funding sources can look elsewhere for a vehicle to meet
their needs or address issues of concern to them:
Aid agencies exist in a relationship with their public and funders where they are seen
as holding funds in trust. They are the vital link between those with compassion and
those with need. Those with compassion want their dollar to go to the needy and are
perceived as only giving if they are sure their wishes are being met. Aid agencies feel
they are caught in a bind. They seek to ensure that their reporting emphasizes how
little they spend on overheads (to suggest that "every cent" goes to the needy), yet
without systems of financial tracking, checks on authority, internal audits properly
funded, and training and monitoring, aid may go astray.. . . If an aid agency admits
either internal corruption or being the victim of corruption, it risks losing the confi-
dence of its aid provider public and thus its funding life-blood.128
III. NGO Anticorruption Compliance Programs
Since NGOs face many of the same corruption risks as traditional business organiza-
tions, the remedy is also similar: putting in place a robust compliance program. A number
of large, well-established NGOs now have, or are in the process of establishing, anticor-
ruption compliance measures as part of their broader compliance programs. But unlike
compliance programs at many large publicly held companies, anticorruption compliance
programs at NGOs are generally a relatively new development.129
Most of the major NGOs have policies that govern all their operations, including fun-
draising, delivering programs, meeting donor requirements, employment, finance, legal,
and other issues. In addition, many of them have adopted codes of ethics or codes of
conduct that govern conflicts of interest, whistleblower policies, and other corruption-
related concerns. 30 Global hotlines, both telephone and internet, are becoming more
routine.' 3' Due diligence practices, however, seem to be at an early stage of development,
with some NGOs only recently turning their attention to this aspect of compliance.132
Putting in place policies and procedures and other components of a compliance program
are less challenging than conducting due diligence and actively monitoring and enforcing
127. Due to the risk to their business, defense contractors have historically been at the forefront in address-
ing compliance issues relating to foreign bribery. Like many NGOs, they are highly dependent upon govern-
mental sources of revenue. But, in many instances, the nature of their product, such as a sole-source contract,
makes it less likely that the long-term survival of the business will ultimately be put in serious jeopardy.
128. Peter Walker, Opportnities for Corruption in a Celebrity Disaster, in CURBING CORRUPTION IN Tsu-
NAmi RELIEF OPERATIONS 100 (2005), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Curbing-Corrup-
tion-Tsunami-Relief/curbing-corruption-tsunami-relief.pdf.
129. Survey, supra note 74, Participants 1, 3, & 4.
130. Charity Navigator specifically includes this information in the "Accountability" section for each NGO
it rates. See, e.g., Charity Navigator, Compassion International, http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?
bay=search.accountability&orgid=3555 (last visited June 27, 2011).
131. See, e.g., American Red Cross, Concern Connection Line, https://www.integrity-helpline.com/Red-
Cross.jsp (last visited June 13, 2011); Feed The Children, Report Fraud or Abuse, http://www.feedthechil-
dren.org/site/PageServer?pagename=org_reportifraud (last visited June 5, 2011); IRD, Who We Are:
Compliance, http://www.ird.org/who/compliance.html (last visited June 13, 2011).
132. Survey, supra note 74, Participant 3.
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a compliance program. 33 A whole range of extremely challenging and often-controversial
decisions can be anticipated.
For some NGOs, the move towards instituting more formal compliance programs was
driven by public revelations of questionable practices, pressure from major donors, or the
prospect of losing USAID funding. "Compliance was a condition for improvement, for
resolving critical issues," said one survey participant referring to the problems his organi-
zation has encountered with one of the U.S. government agencies.134 Losing government
funds can be deadly, as demonstrated by the recent demise of AED, one of the largest and
oldest NGO contractors for USAID.3s Another major NGO, Oklahoma-based Feed
The Children, was recently engulfed in a scandal that drew media attention due to its $1
billion budget and the global scope of its activities. 136 Feed The Children's board of di-
rectors, after ousting its charismatic president and facing a significant decline in donor
support, put in place elements of a compliance program, including a new ethics policy, a
nepotism policy, and a fraternization policy.'3 7
A. ANTrcORRUPTON COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS FOR NGOs: GENERAL
CONSIDERATIONS
The same general principles that apply to compliance programs of issuers and other
companies that are subject to the FCPA and to the UK Bribery Act should apply to
NGOs. Consideration also needs to be given to harmonizing compliance policies gov-
erned by the FCPA and the UK Bribery Act.138 The basic contours of an effective internal
compliance program should resemble those set forth in the U.S. Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for organizations and the U.K.'s Ministry ofJustice's Guidance issued in con-
junction with the UK Bribery Act.139
133. See discussion infra pp. 138-39.
134. Survey, supra note 74, Participant 2.
135. See discussion, supra pp. 130-31.
136. See, e.g., Ken Miller, Feed The Children Charity Under Criminal Investigation By Oklahoma Attorney Gen-
eral, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 26, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/26/feed-the-children-
founder n_814537.html; Debra Blum, A Beleaguered Charity Giant Turns to a Veteran Leader to Restore Its
Reputation, PHILANTHROPY, Dec. 16, 2010, http://philanthropy.com/article/Scandal-Ridden-Charity-Seeks/
125728/.
137. Nolan Clay, Feed The Children No Longer Billion-Dollar Charity, NEwsOK, Apr. 23, 2011, http://new-
sok.com/feed-the-children-no-longer-billion-dollar-charity/article/3561299.
138. For example, since the UK Bribery Act provides no exception, facilitating payments will need to be
prohibited throughout an organization. Similarly, the UK Bribery Act's prohibitions on improper induce-
ments to private individuals or entities, often described as "private bribery," will also need to be implemented
throughout an NGO. Bribery Act, 2010, § 1 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/
23/contents. On the other hand, since the definition of a foreign official is broader under the FCPA, prohibi-
tions on the payment of improper inducements to foreign officials will need to include candidates as well as
political parties and party officials. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(2)
(1998).
139. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AMANuAL § 8All (2011); UK Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act
2010-Guidance about Procedures Which Relevant Commercial Organisations Can Put into Place to Prevent Persons
Associated with Them from Bribing, www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/docs/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf (last vis-
ited Aug. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Bribery Act 2010-Guidance).
SUMMER 2011
616 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
1. Critical Components of an Effective Compliance Program
In implementing a compliance program, the DOJ's policy guidance must always be kept
in mind. "[Tlhe critical factors in evaluating any program are whether the program is
adequately designed for maximum effectiveness in preventing and detecting wrongdoing
by employees and whether .. . management is enforcing the program or is tacitly encour-
aging or pressuring employees to engage in misconduct to achieve business objectives."140
It must determine whether a "compliance program is merely a 'paper program' or whether
it was designed, implemented, reviewed, and revised, as appropriate, in an effective
manner."
141
The considerations for an anticorruption compliance program are essentially the same
whether a traditional business organization or NGO is involved. 142 A separate anticorrup-
tion compliance program is not required if an entity has in place an effective compliance
program for other legal or policy concerns.143 An anticorruption compliance program can
serve as an adjunct or a supplement to existing compliance programs.
a. Proportionate Procedures
An "organisation's procedures to prevent bribery by persons associated with it" must be
"proportionate to the . . . risks [of corruption] it faces and to the nature, scale, and com-
plexity of the organisation's activities."' 44 The procedures must be tailored to meet the
organization's needs. They must be clear, practical, and relevant. Sufficient staff should
be in place "to audit, document, analyze, and utilize the results of the [entity's] compliance
efforts."4s
b. Commitment from the Top
An organization's top management must be committed to preventing the prohibited
conduct by individuals and entities associated with it.146 A "culture" of anticorruption
compliance must be "fostered" throughout the organization and extend to its agents, con-
sultants, and representatives.1 47 An effective compliance program must be more than a
140. U.S. A-TFO-RNEYS MANUAL § 9-28.800 (2008).
141. Id.
142. As was evident from the analysis in the opinion procedure release previously discussed regarding non-
profit involvement with micro-financing in developing countries, many of the proactive measures discussed
and recommended were essentially similar to those employed by more traditional business organizations.
FCPA Review, 10-02 Op. Dep't of Justice 5 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
opinion/2010/1002.pdf; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
143. An organization's compliance program should not necessarily be separate from its system of inter-
nal accounting controls. An effective system of internal accounting controls includes a range of
review and approval guidelines designed to detect and deter questionable conduct. Indeed, the
planning, implementation, and monitoring of a compliance program should be closely linked to,
if not intertwined with, an entity's system of internal accounting controls.
DEMING, nupra note 57, at 49-50.
144. Bribery Act 2010-Guidance, supra note 139, Principle 1; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL, supra note 139, § 8B2.1, Applications Notes, § 2(A) (2011).
145. U.S. ArroRNEYs MANUAL, supra note 140, § 9-28.800.
146. Bribery Act 2010-Guidance, supra note 139, Principle 2; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL,
supra note 139 § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B).
147. Bribery Act 2010-Guidance, supra note 139, Principle 2.
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series of policies and procedures. Employees must be "adequately informed about the
compliance program and [be] convinced of the [entity's] commitment to it.""4 8 Sanctions
must be enforced against senior and lower-level officials as well as employees, agents, and
other intermediaries. 149
Genuine efforts also need to be made to ensure that anyone seeking, in good faith, to
secure guidance or to make appropriate disclosures is not subject to retaliation. 50 Proce-
dures need to be put in place so that knowledgeable officials can quickly answer questions
and respond to concerns.15 The procedures must not be cumbersome or perceived as
being punitive in nature. Otherwise, guidance will not be sought and corrective action
will not be taken.
c. Risk Assessment
The organization must assess the nature and extent of its exposure to potential external
and internal risks of corruption of persons associated with it.1 5 2 "The assessment must be
periodic, informed, and documented."153 Factors and considerations can change over
time.
d. Due Diligence
The organization must undertake due diligence procedures, taking a proportionate and
risk-based approach.15 4 In each situation, the extent of the inquiry should be governed by
the circumstances. But regardless of the context, due diligence must always be conducted
in good faith. It cannot be perfunctory. "It requires a dispassionate consideration of all
relevant factors."155
Due diligence "also entails determining whether the basis for concern is unfounded and,
if not, whether effective means are available to avoid the risks associated with the concerns
raised."156 For example, written agreements by themselves seldom suffice, but they may
deter prohibited conduct by incorporating a series of compliance measures and providing
a basis for termination.
e. Communication and Training
An organization must ensure that its anticorruption policies and procedures are under-
stood throughout the organization. 5 7 Ongoing education and training must be propor-
tionate to the organization's risks.' 5' Compliance policies and procedures must be simple,
clear, and readily available to individuals acting on behalf of the organization.159 To be
148. U.S. ArORNEYS MANUAL, supra note 140, § 9-28.800.
149. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 139, § 8B2.1 (b)(6).
150. Id.
151. DEMING, supra note 57, at 650-51.
152. Bribery Act 2010-Guidance, supra note 139, Principle 3; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL,
supra note 139, § 8B2.1(c), Applications Notes, § 6.
153. Bribery Act 2010-Guidance, supra note 139, Principle 3.
154. Id. Principle 4; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL, supra note 139 § 8B2.1(a)(1), (b).
155. DEMING, supra note 57, at 653.
156. Id.
157. Bribery Act 2010-Guidance, supra note 139, Principle 5; DEMING, supra note 57, at 648.
158. DEMING, supra note 57, at 648.
159. Id.
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effective, the policies and procedures must be understandable to a person unsophisticated
or unfamiliar with the issues.
f. Monitoring and Review
"On an ongoing basis, [a] compliance program must be monitored, regularly reviewed,
and modified as necessary to address weaknesses and to be made more effective."160 The
challenge is to develop a compliance program that effectively addresses areas of concern
without becoming unduly burdensome, unresponsive, and unable to adjust to ever-chang-
ing needs.
2. NGO Compliance Programs: Challenges
In practice, what do NGO anticorruption compliance programs look like?161 Are they
in fact similar to their counterparts at business organizations? If not, what accounts for
the difference? And what challenges do NGOs face in anticorruption compliance?
According to the survey, anticorruption compliance programs at large NGOs are gen-
erally similar to those established by major U.S. corporations.162 Typically, they include
general information about corruption and an explanation of the FCPA; things to watch
for, like red flags; instructions on what to do in certain circumstances; an internal report-
ing system, including a telephone and internet hotline; and rules on the investigation and
punishment of those who violate the NGO's policies.163 This is accompanied by in-per-
160. Id.; see Bribery Act 2010-Guidance, supra note 139, Principle 6; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL, supra note 139 § 8B2.1(b)(5), (c), Applications Notes, § 6.
161. A number of resources originating within the international NGO community are useful in the develop-
ment of some elements of an anticorruption compliance program. Last year, Transparency International
published a guide, PREVENTING CORRUPTION IN HUAANITARIAN OPERATIONs: HANDBOOK OF GOOD
PRACTICES, to help address the corruption risks that potentially affect humanitarian operations. The Hand-
book was developed in cooperation with seven large international NGOs involved in delivering humanitarian
aid around the world. See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, PREVENTING CORRUPTION IN HUMANITA-
RIAN OPERATIONS: HANDBOOK OF GOOD PRACTICES, available at http://www.transparency.org/publica-
tions/publications/humanitarian handbook feb 2010. Several organizations took on the accountability
agenda in foreign aid in general. Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP), the first
humanitarian sector's international self-regulatory body, established certification and accreditation standards
and the complaints handling system. HAP, About Us, http://www.hapintemational.org/about.aspx (last vis-
ited June 6, 2011). The Sphere Project defines and upholds the standards of humanitarian response to disas-
ters through a set of guidelines. The Sphere's main document, the HUMANITARIAN CHARTER AND
MINIMUM STANDARDS IN DISASTER RESPONSE (the Sphere Handbook) requires members to adopt a code of
conduct prohibiting, among other things, corruption in humanitarian operations. THE SPHERE PROJECT,
HUMANITARIAN CHARTER AND MINIMUM STANDARDS IN HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE (2011), available at
http://www.sphereproject.org/component/option,com-docman/task,cat-view/gid, 17/Itemid,203/
langenglish/. A number of other organizations and initiatives, such as Active Learning Network for Ac-
countability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), People in Aid, and Good Humanitarian
Donorship also target compliance and accountability at NGOs. THE Goon ENOUGH GUIDE: IMPACT
MEASUREMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN EMERGENCIES is a set of basic guidelines on accountability and
program impact measurement m emergencies developed by the Emergency Capacity Building Project, a joint
venture of several major international NGOs. See EMERGENCY CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT, THE Goon
ENOUGH GUIDE: IMPACT MEASUREMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN EMERGENCIES, available at http://
www.ecbproject.org/Pool/good-enough-guide-book-en.pdf
162. Survey, supra note 74, Participant 4.
163. Id. Participants 1, 2 & 4
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son and other forms of training, including, in some NGOs, "electronic training," with the
help of written materials developed at the NGO's headquarters.164 The goal is to raise the
staffs corruption and fraud awareness and to teach them how to deal with corruption-
related situations.s65 As one of the survey participants stated, "[i]f our people must pay,
they need to get approval from a high-level person and record the payment properly." 66
When asked to compare their compliance programs with those of business organiza-
tions, some survey participants saw only one difference-a lack of concern about comply-
ing with the accounting and record-keeping provisions of the FCPA.167 Other
participants perceived a major distinction between the nature of activities carried out by
businesses and NGOs resulting in different compliance risks.'68 Yet most participants in
the survey stated that the most significant difference is the degree to which there is a lack
of funds and capacity. These are two of the principal factors that significantly lower the
effectiveness of NGO anticorruption compliance programs.169
To attract donor money, NGOs need to demonstrate that they have reduced their ex-
penses to the absolute minimum. According to the Forbes Charity 200, among large U.S.
NGOs, the average charitable commitment, "calculate[d] [as] how much of a charity's
total expense went directly to the charitable purpose . . . as opposed to management,
certain overhead expenses and fundraising," in 2010 was 86%.170 Some charities survive
and operate on much less than 14%.171 For example, the top four charities in the Forbes
list,172 in terms of charitable commitment, have an efficiency rate of 100%.173 All four of
these charities concentrate their activities on "international needs." The next eleven char-
ities on the list, ten of which are international in orientation, have a charitable commit-
ment rate of 99%.174
Since most donors give money for specific projects and programs and not for general
operations, they want their donations spent on aid and other forms of assistance. This
means that there is practically no money for compliance. 75 Unrestricted grants that
NGOs could use to build and operate compliance programs are scarce, and there are
always many competing demands. With the attitude often being, "[t]his stuff does not
apply to us,"' 76 anticorruption compliance rarely tops the list of the most urgent or vital
needs to win these funds.177 Lack of reliable information about what is going on in the
164. Id.
165. Id. Participant 1.
166. Id.
167. Id. Participant 4.
168. Id. Participants 1 & 3.
169. Id. Participants 1, 2 & 3.
170. William P. Barrett, America's 200 Largest Charities, FORBES, Nov. 17, 2010, http://www.forbes.com/
2010/11/16/forbes-charity-200-personal-finance-philanthropy-200-largest-charities-charity-10-intro.html.
171. Id.
172. The four largest charities according to the Forbes list are: Brother's Brother Foundation, Christian
Blind Mission International, Gifts in Kind International, and Operation Compassion. See The 200 Largest




175. Survey, supra note 74, Participants 1, 2 & 3.
176. Id. Participant 1.
177. Id. Participants 1 & 2.
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field also makes it difficult to compete for funds.178 As one survey participant explained,
"to argue for the [FCPA compliance] budget, for funds for training and so on, I would
have to present the board with a report justifying the need. It would be difficult for me to
come up with such a report due to the lack of information." 79
Similarly, only a few donors are prepared to pay for anticorruption training and educa-
tion. 80 Again, NGOs must take money for these programs from other sources, like the
same rarely available unrestricted grants.S1 Some NGOs include anticorruption and an-
tifraud components in the training programs for their procurement officers and internal
auditors,182 but even that does not appear to be prevalent in many NGOs.
Some NGOs do not even train their country leaders in anticorruption and fraud detec-
tion matters. 83 With some NGOs having difficulties in "getting local staff with capacity
to perform, especially in post-conflict countries where educated people have not been
produced for decades," 84 they often have to start with general education of their local
employees before more complex compliance issues, like anticorruption and antifraud, can
be addressed in their training programs. Education and skill level of the local staff seem to
be major issues for NGOs operating in developing countries.185 Overall, the majority of
the survey participants recognized that the lack of formal anticorruption and other com-
pliance-related training and education represents a major gap in their compliance
programs.
An insufficient number of internal auditors and forensically-trained accountants is an-
other consequence of a lack of funding for compliance-related issues. Many NGOs em-
ploy staff accountants who conduct audits of their programs, including in overseas offices.
But these are regular accountants who have no special training in uncovering fraud or
other financial irregularities.186 The result is that many instances of corruption and fraud
may go undetected. Even if they are discovered, the headquarters office may never hear
about them, or hear several months later because of problems in the organization's struc-
ture, namely the significant autonomy of country offices and patterns of limited internal
communication.18 7
Plus, in an emergency response, such as when a major disaster strikes a country, NGOs
delivering humanitarian aid must hire local staff very quickly. In these circumstances, they
have no time to do any sort of background or reputational check and no chance to get to
know the people involved, which may mean that some of the local staff may sell aid for
cash or otherwise misappropriate it.188 But even when there is no urgency, it may be
178. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
179. Survey, supra note 74, Participant 2.
180. Id. Participants 1 & 2.






187. Id. Participant 3; see also generally supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
188. Survey, supra note 74, Participant 3. An experienced practitioner in the sector noted that in a response
to an emergency,
[a]gencies need to hire large numbers of local staff rapidly, often with little understanding of
cultural, religious, or ethnic backgrounds and affiliations. In many former major operations, aid
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nearly impossible in some countries to have a reliable background check performed even
on key local employees. NGOs instead rely on word of mouth to gain a sense of a
situation.
Having a very lean administrative structure also means that NGOs often do not have
people dedicated specifically to compliance work. Most NGOs have an operations officer
and a general counsel who handle all kinds of issues, including compliance.'89 Inadequate
understanding among the NGO's senior staff of "what a compliance program is about"
sometimes means that the compliance officer may get a lot of other work sent to him or
her, thus limiting the time the officer can spend on compliance issues and reducing the
overall efficiency of the program. 9 o Only a few large NGOs have one or two dedicated
compliance officers.191 As one survey participant put it, "[o]ne person (myself) is reaching
out to [several dozen] field offices."I 92
This outreach is not always easy. As several survey participants pointed out, it is hard to
explain the jurisdictional reach of U.S. anti-bribery laws to foreigners, especially if the
local culture is conducive to corruption. 93 Even more difficult is to make these persons
comply. The problems may range from foreign employees ignoring the headquarters'
compliance procedures to much more complex situations, like one described by a survey
participant:
How do you communicate to the lower level and local employees that we need to
comply with law no matter what? We work in dangerous places. Our people travel
around countries where bad guys are. If they are stopped at a checkpoint and a police
officer asks for $20 before he allows them to continue their travel, or they are under a
gun, would you not pay? How do you say, "You need your superior's approval for
such a payment," if you are under a gun? And then, if you give permission to pay
under certain circumstances-will it not undermine the general message of
compliance?' 94
Since anticorruption compliance creates extra work for overseas offices, local staff can
often be reticent to become actively involved. "People want to do [projects], not
paperwork."s95 Compliance may also strain the NGO's relationship with local officials.
"When we invite a foreign government official to attend our workshop, we require addi-
tional information and additional paperwork [to comply with the anti-bribery part of the
NGO's compliance program], and they don't like it."196
agencies found themselves spending months if not years trying to undo the webs of nepotism and
minor exploitation they had inadvertently put in place. Other issues apply to the rapid buildup of
international staff where, because of a lack of available experienced personnel, relatively inexperi-
enced agency staffers may find themselves administering relatively large and complex operations.
Walker, supra note 128, at 99.
189. Survey, supra note 74, Participant 2.
190. Id. Participant 3.
191. Id. Participant 2.
192. Id. Participant 3.
193. Id. Participants 3 & 4.
194. Id. Participant 1.
195. Id. Participant 4.
196. Id.
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Administering programs funded by different donors, each having different requirements
as to how "their" programs must be administered, means that, in practice, NGOs often
must comply with many arbitrary requirements.197 As one survey participant put it,
One grant may require the approval by the central staff of all purchases over $10,000
while the other one, of all purchases over $25,000. One grant may require direct report-
ing of corruption issues; the other may not. These requirements are more difficult to
meet as our operations are scattered around many countries.198
Such arbitrary obligations put additional strain on the already lean administrative staff
of most NGOs. It is not surprising that some NGO representatives bemoan a bygone
time when USAID was their only donor and the NGO had to comply with a single
standard.199
These are some of the reasons why compliance programs at NGOs may seem "soft"
compared to those of business organizations. With funding and staffing shortages, com-
pliance programs must rely heavily on the personal contacts that the compliance officer,
general counsel, or assistant general counsels establishes with the employees in overseas
offices. One survey participant stated:
The way I operate, I create a contact, a network of people in the field offices who are
conducive to what I do, and I work with them ... We gather information, reach out
and build relationships with local officers . . . I work less formally than a business
compliance officer would.200
Another survey participant, whose organization has one of the most advanced global
compliance programs in the sector, echoes this statement: "[w]e have compliance coor-
dinators in all regions where we operate ... But, these are not formal positions. They are
just helping us. We are also supported by a number of lawyers and the HR depart-
ment."201 Internal auditors may be used to communicate the compliance message to local
staff when they "go to the field offices and explain policies, rules, and legal issues."202 In
the end, reliance on personal contacts and informal cooperation tends to weaken the effec-
tiveness of a compliance program as compliance turns into a voluntary, rather than obliga-
tory, matter.
The semi-voluntary character of compliance at some NGOs is underscored by their
reluctance to issue firm anticorruption and, sometimes, other compliance-related guide-
lines for their overseas offices, relying instead on the "good judgment of local senior man-
agement."203 As an alternative to firm guidance, compliance programs may contain a set
of recommendations on how to act in certain situations. In the words of one survey par-
ticipant, "[w]e issued the FCPA guidance but did it cautiously. We like to be consulted in
case of a problem rather than issue firm requirements. We also described the record-
keeping requirements and asked to inform the regional controller in case of problems." 204
197. Id. Participant 2.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. Participant 3.
201. Id. Participant 4.
202. Id. Participant 3.
203. Id.
204. Id. Participant 2.
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As was mentioned earlier,205 such consultations are not always possible; therefore, deci-
sions made in loco may not be the ones that the headquarters would prefer.
IV. Conclusion
The dangers of corruption in NGO projects and the consequences of such corruption
are ever-present and may cost NGOs their reputation, funding sources, and donors. In-
ternational NGOs also increasingly fear the risks of violating foreign bribery and other
anticorruption laws.206
Yet the mood in the international non-profit circles appears to be that of general con-
cern and cautious waiting. One survey participant reported that "[e]verybody in our space
is concerned ... It is a matter of time before the attention [of the Department of Justice]
will be turned to NGOs."20 7 Another noted, "[w]e are watching the UK Bribery Act
closely as perhaps it applies to NGOs."2 08 Still another survey participant is sure that
"USAID will keep pressure on the NGOs it works with," demanding greater accountabil-
ity. 209 But there also seems to be a consensus that "without a lawsuit, an indictment, or
debarment, nonprofits will do little in this area." 210 Some NGOs are simply relying on
the nature of their activities for some protection: "The Department ofJustice is less likely
to target NGOs than businesses, which gives us a little more comfort."211
Special protective legislation is not suggested for NGOs.212 Unlike most industries,
NGOs with a truly charitable nature are unlikely to be targeted by enforcement authori-
ties for foreign bribery violations. A public backlash and considerable political fallout
from such an agenda can be expected. Practical considerations such as the receptivity of
juries and judges are also likely to discourage the targeting of NGOs in general. But in
egregious situations, enforcement authorities will not, and cannot be expected to, over-
look clear violations, even for NGOs that undertake the most laudable of missions.
For NGOs that are not fundamentally of a charitable nature, and that compete with
more traditional business organizations, the DOJ can be expected to be aggressive in its
enforcement efforts when warranted by the facts and circumstances. While it is less clear
what enforcement officials will do in other jurisdictions, over time NGOs can and should
205. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
206. As an indicator that the time for anticorruption compliance at NGOs has arrived, the roundtable on the
FPCA and anticorruption good practices in the NGO sector, organized last November by InsideNGO, an
umbrella organization for the international relief and development nonprofit community, attracted represent-
atives from about two dozen NGOs. Survey, supra note 74, Participant 1.
207. Id.
208. Id. Participant 3.
209. Id. Participant 2.
210. Id. Participant 3.
211. Id. Participant 1.
212. The underlying basis for the FCPA and other anti-bribery legislation should apply equally to NGOs. If
the NGOs objectives are truly laudable in nature, no basis should exist for the payment of a bribe. Whether
it is in the form of exercise of prosecutorial discretion, an absence of the requisite elements to establish a
violation, or the duress or necessity exceptions, sufficient flexibility currently exists to address extraordinary
situations. Moreover, NGOs have not been subjected to a history of unwarranted prosecutions. To the
contrary, an NGO has not been charged to date with a violation of the FCPA. If any special legislation or
regulations were to be considered, they would relate to requiring that sufficient resources be dedicated to
addressing compliance needs.
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be expected to be fully subject to investigations and enforcement actions. In general,
NGOs can expect to face increasingly greater scrutiny.
International NGOs are also more likely to be targeted by donors and other funding
sources for corruption in their programs and activities. The unique position of many
NGOs, being almost solely dependent on donors as well as governmental and quasi-gov-
ernmental funding sources, dictates the need for greater accountability with a particular
focus on anticorruption compliance. Despite the lack of resources and an assortment of
challenges, NGOs must find efficient and cost-effective ways to implement and enforce
compliance programs that adequately address their corruption risks. The key for the in-
ternational NGO community is to be proactive and not reactive.
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